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COMMUNITY LED DEVELOPMENT AND VULNERABILITY IN A 
POST-DISASTER CONTEXT: CAUGHT IN A SAD ROMANCE*
JOHN F. MCCARTHY 
Abstract
One reading of the social capital literature suggests that the networks and the social relationships 
which enable collective action can be used to address critical livelihood needs, even in disaster 
contexts.   This paper concerns post-tsunami Aceh, where following the largest disaster in forty years, 
one of the biggest reconstruction programs in history implemented livelihoods projects, making use 
of community led recovery approaches. This paper fi nds that social capital ideas stabilized policy 
thinking, legitimized project interventions, and provided a template for project action. Examining the 
eﬀ ects of community led approaches in two sub-districts eight years after the tsunami, it compares 
the few instances in which particular livelihood projects led to enduring forms of collective action, 
with the majority of cases, in which these approaches failed to address the underlying drivers of 
vulnerability. Community led policy narratives often do not match with the logic of social action 
embedded in local networked space. As interventions based on social capital ideas may have limited 
purchase in post-disaster contexts of this kind, eﬀ orts to address vulnerability in post-disaster con-
texts need to address drivers of vulnerability in agrarian livelihoods in a systematic fashion, moving 
beyond the narrowly focused community led livelihood interventions of post-disaster recovery.
1. Introduction
Policy discussions, project inteventions and a wide body of literature now focus on complex pro-
blems creating multiple shocks and stressors that generate disadvantage among large populations. 
In particular, fl ood, drought and other natural disasters, now exacerbated by climate change and 
confl ict, have the potential to transform marginal forms of poverty, vulnerability or even food 
insecurity into chronic problems. When such problems come together in a catastrophic fashion, 
donors make large investments in humanitarian responses. Following the advent of a substantial 
body of work which advocates benefi ciary participation in development (Hickey and Mohan 2005) 
and the “routinication of social capital” in public policy (Woolcock 2010), it is now conventional 
for interventions to “be designed to recognise, support and build on the strengths and capacities 
of those most likely to be victimised by the given crisis” (Anderson 2000: 6). Part of the narrative 
here is that, in the absence of eﬀ ective forms of accountability within the state and through donors, 
better outcomes ensue when projects set up participatory structures to facilitate public scrutiny 
and accountability in both decision making and implementation. The paradox is that, despite the 
deployment of suﬃ  cient resources, the best of intentions and the application of such methodologies, 
in so many cases reconstruction (re)produces vulnerabilities without recovering pre-disaster levels 
of development (Blaikie 2009; Lyons 2009).
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The 2004 tsunami was the world’s largest natural disaster in forty years (Cosgrave 2007), 
devastating Aceh’s west coast, with 130,000 confi rmed dead and an additional 500,000 people 
displaced. Enormous resources were deployed on rehabilitation and reconstruction – in the 
developmental lexicon, “to build back better”. Here “better” amounted to “improving infrastructure 
and adhering to social concerns such as reducing poverty, improving livelihoods and increasing 
equity” (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008: 28). Indeed, in the highly aﬀ ected Indonesian province of 
Aceh, $7.5 billion was spent on post-tsunami relief by more than 463 NGOs and donor agencies 
implementing projects, making Post-tsunami Aceh “one of the largest reconstruction projects ever 
seen in the developing world” (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008). The immediate post-tsunami crisis 
intervention is seen as successful, particularly as it provided emergency assistance, social protection 
during the immediate crisis period, and eﬀ ectively rebuilt infrastructure (Webb 2005; Athukorala 
2010). However, there is now ample evidence that persistent, high levels of longer term, chronic 
poverty and vulnerability created by the insurgency and the disaster remain (World Bank 2008). 
 Researchers have examined many diﬀ erent aspects of the physical, material and human 
response to the tsunami (e.g. Clark et al. 2010; Jayasuriya et al. 2010; Thorburn 2010). However, 
what are the enduring legacies of aid, long after the disaster – when the gaze of the aid industry 
has moved elsewhere? Little work has been done to understand the problem of persistent poverty 
and post-tsunami intervention outcomes in relational terms, while taking into account vernacular 
understandings. This paper will address the following questions: To what degree have social 
networks taken up the logics promoted by community based and community driven development 
(CBD and CDD) project interventions? In what ways has the idea of mobilising social capital 
through project interventions led to enduring collective action to address livelihood solutions?1  
This paper argues that the gap between the intentions of interventions that attempt to mobilise 
social capital and the outcomes they achieved need to be understood in terms of the contradiction 
between, on the one hand, the logic of community led policy narratives, and on the other hand, the 
aid practices and situational logic that shaped attempts to assist communities. This gap emerges 
from three parallel sets of processes or practices. First, participatory livelihood thinking and 
social capital ideas clearly structured the intervention policy in Aceh, providing a template for 
addressing community needs. However, good policy may fail to provide a frame for understanding 
the drivers of poverty; and policy statements may neither provide a good guide for implementation, 
nor represent fi eld realities (Mosse 2010). Indeed, a second set of exigencies shaped the activities of 
NGOs and donor agencies, which included: the transient nature of assistance; the kind of delivery 
mechanisms available; the exit strategies set into project planning; and the needs of donors and 
NGOs to achieve success. Negotiating rural development remains diﬃ  cult, even more so when 
a tsunami follows a confl ict. The complexity of the dynamics generating poverty, vulnerability 
and food insecurity ensures that linear programmatic approaches will face signifi cant challenges, 
particularly when project templates leave structural and relational dynamics outside their technical 
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1 Both CBD and CDD approaches aim to harness and “build” social capital, using social capital ideas 
as discursive justifi cation for project interventions. While CBD has been defi ned as “an umbrella term 
for projects that actively include benefi ciaries in their design and management” (Mansuri and Rao 
2004: 1), CDD approaches tend to be involve more encompassing participant involvement in decisions 
regarding how funds are spent. CDD approaches involve two main components: facilitation and sup-
port for participation in the selection, design and implement of a development project and funding for 
the implementation of the project (King et al. 2010). Here I use the term community led to refer to the 
wider set of CDD and CBD approaches. 
framework for analysis and action (Li 2007). At the same time, donor practices necessarily ran into 
a third set of factors for which neither participatory/CDD templates, nor post-recovery narratives, 
provided adequate explanations: Acehnese fi eld realities. Given the strong inequalities, entrenched 
patterns of relational power, and disorganisation, fragmentation and trauma following the confl ict 
and the tsunami, there was only limited potential for successful community based development 
approaches. This paper shows that a particular post-disaster situational logic – building on historical 
social relations and more than a decade of confl ict – shaped modes of social action that occurred in 
networked space, aﬀ ecting both what was desirable and achievable at a particular time. Signifi cant 
reductions in poverty and vulnerability require broader and on going strategies of social policy and 
economic development in addition to the narrowly targeted community led livelihood interventions 
deployed here.
This study draws its conclusions from local qualitative studies in two heavily aﬀ ected sub-districts 
on the west coast of Aceh Besar that are linked with a large scale quantitative survey (Kecamatan 
Development Program 2006), and a survey of indirect indicators of social capital within two 
sample villages (here labeled village 1 and 2) selected randomly from each sub-district. This 
approach bears in mind the conclusion of other researchers that the character of social capital tends 
to depend on historical and social context; that the search for generalised rules which correlate 
types of social capital with specifi c social variables has proved ineﬀ ective; and that indicators of 
social capital provide only a poor guide to the critical informal dynamics associated with collective 
action (Pelling and High 2005). Qualitative semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions 
were undertaken with village leaders, sub-district and district oﬃ  cials, local police and military 
oﬃ  cials, and customary leaders; as well as key village informants, World Bank and PNPM project 
facilitators, NGOs and local academics. The study also sought to complement the more extensive 
analysis of the challenges faced by donors in the post-tsunami context, in the process providing 
space for vernacular perspective of the participatory, CBD and CDD approaches deployed in Aceh.
The present paper pursues these questions in the following way. First, it undertakes a review of 
frameworks for analysing social capital and community based or driven approaches. Second, it 
analyses “successful” participatory livelihood and CDD projects in two sub-districts. Finally, it 
draws some conclusions regarding where elements of adaptive capacity – the ability to respond to 
vulnerability – emerged.
2. The Romance of Social Capital
Social capital-based approaches to community development have now become widespread. The 
original thesis argued that social capital not only facilitates collective action and economic deve-
lopment, but that it is ultimately the mechanism that connects the two (Woolcott 2010: 481). While 
articulated in various ways, the simple idea here is that the social capital embedded in participatory 
groups encompasses shared understandings of fairness, leadership, rights and duties, and ways 
of doing things amounts to something that can be built, tapped, used, or otherwise mobilised for 
developmental ends (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004). This has been taken up in community driven 
development (CDD) and social fund approaches which seek to get communities involved in choo-
sing how funds might be spent, thereby developing interventions that more eﬀ ectively support 
community development. The compelling prospect of “getting the social relations right” exerts an 
attractive power: the romance of mobilising social capital and thereby achieving much better deve-
lopmental outcomes.
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Consequently, with renewed focus on “getting the social relations right”, the success of projects has 
come to be seen to hinge on their ability to engage with the local social context. However, critics 
have found the concept of social capital slippery and highly contested (Woolcott 2010; Fox 2007). 
First, social capital can facilitate transactions among particular interest groups, while excluding 
other groups from access to resources (Cleaver 2005). In other words, social capital both helps 
and hinders advancement and dealing with collective action problems. Second, approaches using 
social capital ideas may tend to instrumentalise social life (Mosse 2004). Third, social capital 
approaches may sidestep structural questions of power and inequality, setting aside political econo-
mic relations from their “knowable, technical domain” of governmental practices (Li 2007: 231). 
Fourth, critics argue that the social capital approach fi ts with a form of poverty analysis that tends 
to cast responsibility for both poverty and poverty reduction on the poor themselves, setting aside 
the case for large-scale public action to engage with the drivers of poverty and vulnerability. 
 Despite these critiques, the questions raised by the social capital thesis – understood here as the 
networks and social relationships that facilitate collective action (Fox 2007: 142) – converge with 
an analysis of poverty in relational terms. The ability of individuals to leverage resources depends 
upon their access to particular social arrangements. While individuals with “wealth in people” will 
be relatively empowered, those who are most vulnerable tend to be those who are unable to make 
social claims or who have been deprived of a dependent status (Mosse 2010: 1158). This supports an 
analysis of how social inequality and risk are (re)produced within vertical and horizontal networks 
that facilitate (or not) access to entitlements. Engagements between communities, donors, and the 
state can then be analysed in terms of how resources and information fl ow, what dynamics shape 
access to external resources, and how internal community resources are mobilised. 
2.1 Social capital, poverty and food insecurity in rural Aceh
A perusal of post-tsunami project documents points to the widespread utilisation of participatory 
CBD/CDD lexicon. Project evaluations stress the “role of the community in building back better” 
– for instance in “community led and implemented village infrastructure projects” and “consensus-
based village mapping processes” (BRR, x). The key reconstruction agency, the BRR, noted that 
it explicitly intended the process of reconstruction to “strengthen social capital and community 
capacities”, as well as “to innovate and improve public sector delivery and eﬀ ectiveness” (BRR, 
43). World Bank assessments also found that “social capital at the community level in Aceh is 
strong” (Kecamatan Development Program 2006, 72). Given that “social capital is widely accepted 
as one of the key pillars for empowerment at the local level and as one of the key ingredients for 
successful community development programs”, this indicated an appropriate logic of intervention.
 Fieldwork revealed particular patterns of network formation. The World Bank surveys had found 
high participation rates for social activities. Amongst comparatively homogenous, poorly educated 
rural communities, villagers intensively interact with family, friends or neighbours; for instance, 
routinely exchanging gifts, assistance and labour. However, closer scrutiny revealed that these 
horizontal networks which involved balanced forms of reciprocity were less uniformly strong. 
Interviews revealed that the confl ict and the subsistence crisis had generated a breakdown in trust 
and reciprocity among some villagers: for instance, when people could not trust their neighbours 
during the confl ict; when poor villagers could not aﬀ ord to help a neighbour; or when a loan to a 
neighbour was unable to be repaid. As one informant noted, “we have to be self-suﬃ  cient; we are 
not brave enough to ask for help, for instance, if we run out of salt, we can’t ask the neighbour.” 
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Second, as the World Bank fi ndings reported, villagers were less comfortable in more formal 
settings (Kecamatan Development Program 2006, 74), with participation rates lower for village 
meetings compared to customary (adat) and informal modes of organisation, which remain the key 
vehicles for social organisation. Yet, our interviews revealed that adat forms of organisation were 
delinked from processes of interest articulation: they managed resources or coordinated action 
within a limited scope – for example collective labour to repair irrigation channels or organise 
harvest festivals – but did not contribute substantially to solving village development issues. Third, 
our surveys and interviews also revealed that villages were socially diﬀ erentiated along class and 
gender lines. Only a few individuals had strong vertical “bridging” relationships outside the village, 
into sub-district and district networks. These individuals – typically male landlords, moneylenders, 
village shopkeepers and the descendants of the old Acehnese chiefs (uleebalang) – took up key 
positions in village administration and with donor and state village programmes, mediating access 
to resources from the outside. Given that most villagers depended on these more powerful actors, 
they had limited scope to sanction them; and were therefore left open to exploitation and dependency. 
As we will see, many villagers resented the power of these actors; and given their inability to hold 
these actors accountable, many grievances festered and remained unaddressed. As noted above, the 
World Bank surveys of indicators of social capital concluded that Aceh’s community-level social 
capital was strong (Kecamatan Development Program 2006, 72). Yet, the conclusion here is that 
despite apparent evidence of “social capital”, given the strong inequalities and entrenched patterns 
of relational power, there was only limited potential for collective action to address poverty and 
vulnerability through the village based community development approaches deployed at this time. 
Here chronic, persistent forms of poverty and vulnerability remain critical in what remains one of 
the poorest provinces in Indonesia (Waspada 2013). Aceh remains a place with pockets of very high 
vulnerability to food insecurity (World Food Program 2009). Earlier poverty assessments of Aceh 
diﬀ erentiated the “structurally poor” from the “shocked”: those whose poverty was linked to the 
impacts of the longstanding confl ict and structural defi ciencies in the Aceh economy on productive 
activities: and those driven into even deeper vulnerability due to asset loss after the tsunami (Aceh 
Poverty Assessment 2008). As we will see later, the problem in the tsunami aﬀ ected regions was 
that short-term eﬀ orts to rehabilitate assets, and rehabilitate the livelihoods of the “shocked”, did 
not always address the structural problems which re-emerged following the end of the economic 
stimulus of post-tsunami reconstruction. Indeed, surveys undertaken during this study, in sample 
villages in Aceh Besar eight years after the tsunami, reveal clear evidence of varying degrees of 
vulnerability and composite food insecurity among up to fi fty per cent of households.2 As discussed 
elsewhere, the confl ict and tsunami led to a shift in livelihoods on the west coast of Aceh: from a 
formerly diverse portfolio of activities (McCarthy 2006), to aid dependence during the immediate 
post-tsunami period (Thorburn 2010), and now to an overdependence on rice agriculture by mostly 
sharecropper farmers integrated into a highly uneven rural political economy, which remains 
subject to production failures (McCarthy, forthcoming). This is the context in which the post-
tsunami interventions took place.
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2 For reasons of space a deeper analysis of food security and vulnerability in post-tsunami Aceh is ad-
dressed elsewhere (McCarthy, unpubl. paper). 
3. Post-tsunami interventions: Searching for project “success”
Restoring productive assets and livelihoods constituted a key focus of recovery work in Aceh. 
Indeed, there was a “deluge of livelihood programmes”, and these “were the facet of the recovery 
process most often encountered by households” (Thornburn, 2010: 91). These included cash grants 
or loans for enterprise development, and economic assistance in the form of livestock and agriculture 
programmes.3 As noted earlier, this research sought to identify “successful” projects – those that 
have more or less continued to provide livelihood benefi ts to villagers more than eight years after 
the tsunami. In other words, looking for success here meant trying to understand where we could 
fi nd project engagements that supported more enduring forms of social action to address livelihood 
needs. Interviews in villages revealed donors had funded seven to ten of these livelihood development 
projects in each village, with most of these in each case engaging community led development 
approaches. In the two sub-districts, villagers only pointed to three salient donor sponsored activities 
that continue to function eight years after the tsunami. These are discussed below, alongside the 
ongoing World Bank initiated CDD and the communities’ own eﬀ orts to mobilise the state. 
(i) Reviving fi sheries
In the past, Aceh’s fi sherman operated privately owned fi shing platforms (palung) oﬀ  the coast. 
Fishermen anchored their palung several kilometres oﬀ  the coast, using lamps at night to attract 
the fi sh, and returned to the village each morning during the eastern monsoon to sell their catch. 
Each morning the palung owner received half the catch as his due, with the eight-member crew 
dividing the remaining 50% among themselves. To ensure the palung succeeded economically, 
the operators monitored the profi tably of their enterprise carefully; maintaining the platforms and 
fi xing problems immediately if they emerged. The tsunami destroyed the palung. While sixty used 
to ply the coast, in 2012 fewer than twenty operated out of the key local fi shing port.  
 As a palung costs up to Rp140 million, fi shers were not able to rebuild them themselves, and several 
donors stepped in. A Singapore Red Cross funded project sponsored the construction of fi ve palung 
by local builders, and at the time of this research, four of these remained in operation.4  Under this 
scheme, the main fi shing village was to oversee the palungs’ operation, with one palung to be oper-ated 
under each hamlet head. Timing here was the key: the project occurred much later, when fi shers were 
returning to their livelihoods. At the time of research, the project had achieved a successful balance 
between benefi ts and responsibilities, and more eﬀ ective institutional design. The palung heads were 
learning to fi x problems as they emerged, and taking responsibility for maintenance. The key question 
remained whether an eﬀ ective captain had emerged who could mobilise resources to protect the asset 
and sanction poorly performing fi shers, similar to the role played previously by private owners.  
 Earlier, the Asian Development Bank funded the construction of six palung. Although there are 
several competing accounts of what occurred,5 according to a village leader the palung were left 
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3 Thornburn (2010) estimates that approximately 12% of all tsunami relief as of September 2007 had 
been devoted to livelihood projects.
4 In the one case where the palung had failed, the captain failed to manage it well, and the palung ran at a 
loss and fell into debt. As the village had allocated the profi ts accumulated from fi shing to other priori-
ties, there was no budget set aside to fund its repair. It sat rotting on the wharf. Although the subdistrict 
head urged the other hamlets operating palung to fund its repair, this was yet to be agreed. Learning 
from this experience, another palung captain took a loan in his own name to repair his palung, and with 
the agreement of the village head deducted money from each catch to repay the loan.
5 Several villagers alleged that the ADB contractor had failed to build the palung to local specifi cations, 
in disrepair on the wharf, and none remained operational. While ADB had granted the palung to 
a fi sher cooperative, three other interventions by Oxfam and USAID, which involved setting up 
village cooperatives to manage palung in neighbouring villages, suﬀ ered a similar fate. During 
the period of aid dependence following the tsunami, fi shermen were not ready to go back to their 
livelihoods. In the words of one interviewee, “At that time there was lots of aid fl owing into the 
village, so people were still lazy, not thinking of working”. In each case, villagers had either failed 
to maintain the palung, or experienced internal confl icts, or the cooperative had fallen into debt, 
leading to the palung either being abandoned, or to a decision by the village head to sell the vessel 
“rather than lose everything”. In these cases, an inability to manage fi nances properly, horizontal 
confl icts within the cooperatives, and the failure to maintain the palung knocked the vessels out of 
action. With village-operated palung, it is less clear who owns the palung, and who is responsible 
for maintaining it. Even if ownership is vested in the village, decision-making is a long process, 
involving asking for permission from the village head, and lengthy deliberations in the village. 
Cooperatives under village ownership also depend on practices which are not established in the 
village, such as the transparency and accountability required to sustain an enterprise under col-
lective control. Consequently, the cooperatives suﬀ ered from diﬀ use forms of accountability and 
enforcement, and there were incentives to shift profi ts to meet other village needs. In the unsuccess-
ful cases, it remained unclear how the donors had provided for ongoing assistance and supervision. 
 The consequences for fi shing livelihoods in Aceh were severe. A village leader estimated that 
only 136 of the 250 fi shermen in his village had obtained a position on the palung. The other fi shers 
had failed to gain access to either new palung, or to new boats and fi shing equipment distributed 
during the reconstruction period. Several impoverished fi shermen from other villages who were 
interviewed during the course of this research related how they remained “without a future”, and 
now took to the sea on rubber tyres in an attempt to catch at least some fi sh – a remarkably poor 
outcome given the signifi cant funds allocated for fi sheries reconstruction. 
(ii) The revolving livestock fund 
Several projects developed community-based rotating cattle schemes. Under these schemes, the 
user group entrusts each individual with responsibility for one cow. After the cow gives birth, the 
villager keeps the oﬀ spring, and the parent animal rotates to another participant. This enables 
villagers without savings to develop assets that can be used in a time of need.   
 Heifter International developed a successful initiative in the village 2 area. One informant noted 
that out of dozens of NGO projects, this was one of the few still in operation: eight years later, four 
of the six revolving cattle groups are still extant. The head of the project was the descendent of the 
uleebalang (chief). During the post-tsunami period, donors recruited him to oversee several projects, 
all of which failed. As he noted, “assistance is often taken to be a gift for which people do not have to 
take responsibility, so that it is often sold or used for consumption”. Farmers participating in a cattle 
group might say the cow had died, when they had sold it. Under his scheme, each farmer groups 
works together to develop a cowshed and to manage the cattle, with revolving credit activities and 
labour-sharing activities developed to support the livelihoods of members, according to agreements 
within the group. To ensure continuity, the project head developed a system of monitoring and 
supervision, with strict sanctions and incentives. Participants signed an agreement in front of the 
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using poor quality timber and ensuring that the palung could not go to sea for a prolonged period. The 
head of a neighbouring hamlet related that villagers were jealous, resenting that they had failed to win the 
contract to build the palung, and shifting the blame for its failure onto the contractor.
police, which set out the scheme’s rules. The head inspected barns to check that individuals were 
providing food, keeping their facilities clean, and caring for the cattle. If he found a farmer shirking 
on more than one occasion, the head confi scated and reallocated their cow. As members were 
forced to follow group regulations, this developed confi dence in the institution and trust between 
members, and the continuity of these groups was ensured.   
 The project clearly mapped onto community structures and networks. It depended on the strong, 
asymmetrical power relationship and patron-client links associated with this capable but rather 
authoritarian leader. As a powerful local fi gure, he had extensive connections with government and 
outside NGOs, and was able to oversee training and facilitate agreements between participating 
farmers. Contrary to the “hippy model of community participation”,6 at times the head mobilised his 
inherited authority in a top-down fashion, initiating the sanctions which underlay the institutional 
arrangements that guaranteed the project’s continuity. The head placed the continuity of the project 
above abstract principles of distributional and procedural justice. The head acknowledged that he 
would only select farmers whom he could trust. Farmers who were not participating complained that 
there was no transparency in the selection of group membership, noting that the participants who were 
selected tended to be those close to project leaders. A few farmers also complained that the regulation 
of the groups was too strict. However, focus group discussions revealed that in gene-ral, those who 
did join were happy with the groups. Although those excluded were bitter, they still hoped that the 
initiative would be extended to include them. Questions emerged regarding whether the groups had 
been captured by village elites, and whether the opportunity costs were too high for the poor; while 
farmers would benefi t in the long term, in the short term they needed to fi nd time to look after the 
cattle, and funds to contribute to running costs. However, in the two groups surveyed, approximately 
70% were sharecroppers; suggesting that the poor were highly engaged in these groups. 
 In contrast, when FAO funded a cattle project in village 1, they faced the problem that Oxfam, the 
Red Cross and other agencies had provided cash grants to some of the villagers, to rebuild livelihoods. 
Villagers who had failed to receive cash grants demanded that the FAO cattle be provided as a grant, 
in lieu of the grants to which they claimed an entitlement. FAO acquiesced to these demands; thus, in 
this case village incentives and demands derailed this revolving savings scheme.
(iii) The micro-hydro project
Following the tsunami, a donor provided Rp 2.5 Billion to set up a micro-hydro project to supply 
electricity to villages in one of Aceh’s subdistricts. To elicit participation, a cooperative was formed 
to own and to operate the generator. At the start there were 50 members who held meetings every 
three months. Initially, villagers received very cheap electricity, paying just a small fee to help repair 
the equipment. After the generator broke down, the electricity was now to be sold to the national 
grid to repay a loan that had been taken out by the project, and subsided electricity was no longer 
available. We conducted interviews with some poor villagers in the dark: they were unable to make 
these payments. In this case, the project fi tted into existing power structures: villagers remained 
highly dependent upon the key village family, who meditated a range of economic opportunities. 
Despite formal monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms set out in state regulations governing 
cooperatives, there was no transparency or accountability downwards, and the project appeared 
to be have been appropriated by powerful village interests. Despite the participatory rhetoric arti-
culated in the project website, villagers did not have a real sense of control or ownership. There 
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6 Vajja and White 2008: 1148. 
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were no clearly articulated entitlements or mechanisms for gaining access to benefi ts, nor did state 
institutions support the eﬀ ective operation of the cooperative.  
(iv) Social funding: the PNPM community driven approach
During this period, a World Bank supported community-driven development programme operated 
in this area, initially funnelling up to 8 billion rupiah ($880,000) per sub-district to address “the 
special needs in post-disaster areas” (Voss 2008).7 The programme provided a community-driven 
mechanism to identify, fi nance and implement small scale public investments. The object was to 
improve access to economic and social infrastructure and services among the poor, avoiding the 
weaknesses associated with the “top-down” investment planning typical of state agencies. 
 The National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM) also “aimed at accelerating 
poverty reduction” by “empower[ing] rural and urban communities to proactively participate in 
development” (PNPM support facility, 2008, 3). PNPM provided each sub-district with a block 
grant to fund small projects. PNPM also set up a deliberative mechanism, whereby communities 
identify priority projects and compete to have their project funded. After ranking project options 
according to programme criteria, a representative sub-district community committee selected the 
projects to be funded. Then individual villages received the funds to carry out activities – princi-
pally infrastructure development projects – under accountability procedures designed to avoid 
corruption. As the projects were identifi ed and carried out by local communities, they sought to 
contribute to social capital formation and local community driven development.  
 A number of assessments have found that PNPM provides a better, more eﬃ  cient way to allocate 
funds for building infrastructure; including providing employment opportunities which, as other 
studies found, increased consumption by up to 11 per cent (Voss 2008; McLaughlin et al. 2007). 
During interviews, several village leaders agreed with this proposition, arguing that PNPM 
provided an improved mechanism for decision making, delivering a system that allocated fund in 
response to village requests in contrast to the fi ckle state process. But fi eld level interviews also 
revealed that project decision making clearly played into dysfunctional village networks and the 
crisis of trust that enveloped village government. Many villagers remained apathetic about the pro-
posal development process: they saw it as dominated by elite aspirations and unlikely to provide 
signifi cant assistance to ordinary villagers, with funding used opportunistically by powerful actors, 
and work opportunities awarded only to those close to the project facilitators. Given that individual 
survival in the village depended upon maintaining good relations with those mediating access to 
land and other livelihood opportunities, there were few channels to hold such actors accountable.8 
This concurs with other assessments of social fund and community driven development processes, 
7 Initially known as the sub-district development programme (KDP), the programme was scaled up and 
rolled out on the national level as the National Program for Community Empowerment (Program Na-
sional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat or PNPM).
8 In village 2, many villagers remained apathetic about the proposal development process because they saw 
it as dominated by elite aspirations, not able to provide signifi cant assistance to ordinary villagers, and 
with funding used opportunistically by these powerful actors. Rather than have a confl ict, it is better to 
withdraw.” “There is no point in getting angry, we have to live in the kampung”. The relationship between 
a vulnerable villager and the coordinator remained important for gaining access to work opportunities 
allocated under the tender, ensuring that those cultivating relations with this actor – a considerable section 
of the village – were afraid to mention this problem. Another village leader fi lled in the details: the coor-
dinator did not pay those subcontracted to do the work until very late, and then not fully, i.e. not according 
to the wage rate set out beforehand. There were few channels to hold this actor accountable.
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which have found that these processes tend to be shaped by existing social relations, and that they 
are necessarily led, controlled and even captured by key actors (cf. Vajja and White 2008). 
 In an earlier assessment, Voss (2008) found that “despite an inclusive approach to community 
organising that seeks to bring all community members into the decision making process, the results 
indicated that disadvantaged groups are not benefi ting”. The marginalised included those with 
lower levels of education, female-headed households, and other disadvantaged groups, including 
the landless.9 Interviews revealed that the silence of the poor emerged from a combination of 
disempowerment, reticence and a lack of time.10 The transaction costs of participating in these 
CDD activities remained high, and for the most part only wealthier villagers could aﬀ ord to 
stay involved. A number of informants alleged that discussions tended to occur during informal 
meeting involving the key villagers, often with one powerful actor eﬀ ectively making the decisions. 
The fruit of these decisions are then brought to the general village meeting, when the proposal 
for submission to the programme was discussed. As PNPM projects provided facilitators, and an 
outside-directed process of guidance, monitoring and supervision, it worked much more eﬀ ectively 
than other post-tsunami interventions. Nonetheless, the process was still clearly embedded in 
village networked space. When asked about this, the sub-district PNPM facilitator noted that, with 
so many villages to handle, it was beyond the capacity of the programme facilitators to overcome 
many types of problems. “If there are problems [in PNPM decision making and implementation of 
programmes], it’s the responsibility of all sides, not just us; if the village is good, PNPM will go well; 
if the village is weak, it will be weak.” Given the dependence of the project on functioning village 
networks dominated by powerful actors, he admitted that PNPM could not overrule governing 
structures: “If the facilitators openly take the side of the poorer people in the kampung, then the 
project does not succeed”. Yet, as in other cases, this community based development led to debates, 
controversy and even demonstrations by villages regarding appropriate ways of spending the block 
grants. A key problem, as refl ected in other studies, was that some villagers felt village needs and 
priorities insuﬃ  ciently matched with the types of activities that could be implemented by this CDD 
programme (King et al. 2010). 
The capacity of CDD activities to address poverty remains an open question, with critical studies 
suggesting that CDD plays only a minor role in assisting the chronic poor and more marginal 
groups (Rao and Ibdfi ez 2003). In this case, as PNPM funds had to be spent on public goods 
and funds awarded to the villages in this survey were spent predominantly on small-scale village 
infrastructure, even though villages had already had extensive infrastructure built during the 
early post-tsunami period. One village leader argued that PNPM funds should instead focus ex-
plicitly on livelihood problems. He suggested that a lack of clear ideas among villagers, and an 
established practice of building infrastructure by actors who benefi ted from contracting, led to the 
misapplication of funds to unneeded infrastructure, such as improving the drains and gutters around 
the village. Assessment reports have noted that many problems emerged when the programme was 
scaled up to the national level (Akatiga 2010). In this case, the village head argued that PNPM 
9 PNPM provides for a bottom up, participatory planning process that aims to empower villages to plan 
for their own development needs. However, deliberative processes require the engagement of villagers, 
in order to understand the needs and potential of the village and work consciously through the proc-
esses of arranging the program.
10 One villager noted that meetings take half a day, but then the activities “make little diﬀ erence to the 
community economy”. Another said that he had followed several steps in the PNPM process, however 
he chose not to join every night. 
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activities required more eﬀ ective facilitation, particularly because those making the decisions had 
insuﬃ  cient understanding about the requirements of the poor. When asked about this, the sub-
district PNPM facilitator argued that although a facilitator might oﬀ er subtle suggestions, they 
could not state what a village required.
 Ironically, in village 2, the control of the programme by powerful actors allowed for PNPM 
project funds to be bundled with other funds to support a livelihood related project: the extension 
of the irrigation system into the rice paddy. Here, the same powerful village actors against whom 
villagers had raised vocal complaints about arbitrary and self-serving behaviour, had advocated 
successfully on behalf of the village in PNPM subdistrict meetings. One village elder lamented the 
way in which the monies were controlled; however, given that the interests of landlords and poor 
sharecroppers were in alignment on this issue, he was happy that two billion rupiah would now be 
put into improving the irrigation channels, in the hope of increased production for both the poor 
and the village elite. However, he reserved judgement on the outcomes: “we need to see how this 
works out … if people are serious it will work, but if it’s manipulated, then something else will 
occur”. In contrast, in village 1, where power relations were much more symmetrical and processes 
more participatory, village leaders had failed to use the CDD to address the key local developmental 
needs – that is, fi xing the irrigation and developing a road to facilitate access to cash crop gardens 
– for the benefi t of the poor.11 
 Since 2008, the PNPM programme also facilitated the coordination of business proposals by 
women: the granting and return of loans under a group-based micro-credit programme for rural 
women, known as Simpan Pinjam Perempuan or SPP. SPP provided one of few sources of capital in 
the village, and it specifi cally targeted women. To receive a loan under SPP, women were required to 
form a group and develop a credible business plan. Lenders were then obliged to make repayments 
every three months. Under a system of peer control, there were clear sanctions for participants. 
If one woman did not pay, the group had responsibility for meeting the repayment. The target of 
the SPP programme remained ensuring that loans fl owed and that repayments accorded with the 
schedule. If repayments failed, the village would not receive SPP loans in the next period, and the 
fl ow of all provincial village development (BKPG) funds would cease.
The poorest women in the village were generally not participating in SPP. Poor women without 
secure livelihoods were hesitant to take the loans, because they were not confi dent they could 
make the repayment schedule.12 Women complained of a lack of guidance regarding where their 
11 In village 1, some of the key village actors’ villagers felt that the priority should be irrigation development. 
However, one vocal villager opposed putting up irrigation for funding because most of the sawah was 
owned by landowners from outside the village, ensuring that the benefi ts of PNPM would not fl ow directly 
to resident villagers. The head of the farmer group remarked that the sawah was really kemukiman sawah 
– it belonged to farmers across the three villages – whereas PNPM grants were is decided upon at a village 
level, ensuring that it would be diﬃ  cult allocated funds from one village’s proposal to fi x up the kemukiman 
sawah. The village secretary complained that proposals from the village failed to become a priority within 
the ranking process that determined how sub-district block grants would be spent. He regretted that village 
leaders were unable to advocate forcefully for village priorities. He felt that the programme framework was 
too rigid: while it provided for certain types of public goods, it would not accept proposals for building a 
place of worship for women or for constructing a road to village gardens – as these did fi t the PNPM fund-
ing criteria. Dissatisfi ed with the programme, a group of villagers demonstrated outside the PNPM oﬃ  ce. 
The problem here was that villagers did not accept PNPM criteria or the need to compete for funds – as 
they were forced to under PNPM – but rather saw PNPM funds as an entitlement.
12 Several poor women interviewed during the project had initially taken out loans but later dropped out. We 
interviewed respondents who used the loans for productive purposes, petty trade, livestock development, 
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business activities might best be channeled, and which markets they might develop, or indeed how 
money accessed through micro-credit schemes might best be used. Other assessments have drawn 
similar conclusions, noting that in the absence of clear ideas regarding income generating activities, 
businesses were often not viable; and that supporting activities to help with marketing or buying in 
bulk were absent. Consequently, women’s groups were able to improve livelihoods in only a few 
cases (Akatiga 2010).13
(v) District development projects: using vertical networks 
For villagers attempting to address critical developmental needs, a key alternative to available CDD 
related mechanisms remained scaling up  – using vertical “bridging” connections up into the state 
to lobby for key resources. Following special autonomy, the Aceh district government had large 
amounts of funding available for rural development. However, according to the sub-district head, 
the disbursement of funds tended to be tied up in political disputes between the legislative and 
the executive. In this politically charged environment, where the focus remained infrastructure 
projects, projects tended to be exchanged for political favours. Here village leaders pointed to a lack 
of responsiveness from formal district government agencies to village vulnerability.14 While district 
government agencies had granted assistance, it tended to be sporadic: the district agricultural agency 
was yet to develop the capacity to deliver consistent programmes that addressed critical village 
livelihood needs.
In village 1, villagers wished to obtain funding to build a road, to facilitate access to market durian 
and revitalise their hillside gardens. While the village had repeatedly sought PNPM funds, the 
request had failed to gain the required support in the sub-district community deliberation process 
(MAD). Accordingly to one account, this was because the project was deemed so expensive and 
that it would require grants over several years. For three years, village leaders have failed to obtain 
funding via district planning meetings (musrenbang). Finally, a contractor with a timber interests 
across the province, a “son of the village” with large landholdings there, mobilised his social 
relations in the district assembly. The assembly allocated some funding for this road. Once again 
this worked because interests of villagers aligned with the interests of a powerful actor, who would 
thereby obtain access to the forest for logging and to develop an oil palm plantation.
 In village 2, the family descendent from the uleebalang focused on obtaining funds to build a 
road to facilitate access to the rice fi elds, as well as for a project to upgrade the irrigation system. 
cake production or other household industries, or even buying agricultural inputs for their rice fi elds. How-
ever, given the lack of other sources of loans, we found respondents who had used funds to buy a fridge or 
to tile their fl oor. There appeared to be no sanctions if SPP funds were not used according to the proposal, 
or even if they were not used for productive purposes. Women noted that the main thing was to meet the 
procedural requirements of the organisers: for the loan to be repaid. It remained unclear to what extend 
PNPM succeeded in overcoming the vulnerability of marginal households who received SPP funds.
13 A key weakness in this phase of the social fund implementation remained facilitation. The SPP pro-
gramme funded several women to each set up a warung at the local waterfall. A group of ten women 
received a bridal makeup course and the provision of makeup equipment so that they could work as 
makeup artists in the advent of a village wedding. Given the number of warung already operating and 
that only three women had married the previous year, it remained unclear how these activities would 
generate a secure stream of income.
14 As one key villager noted, “if we hope to get help from the government, then we will regret it. This is 
not going to work out. The government washes it hands; it is not thoroughly investigating what needs 
to be done to get agriculture working again. If government was thinking productively, he would come 
down and help work it out. But it is very diﬃ  cult to build a bridge into the government”.
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To this end, the son, who was also the village PNPM facilitator, invested in developing networks 
into political parties, joining the “team success” of the district head who was seeking election. As 
he noted, this was “the only way to score a goal”. In the run up to elections, when the district head 
visited the area to attend a traditional feast, the district head accepted a proposal. A contract was 
given to a public works contractor, for a project to compact a road into the rice fi eld, and to build a 
primary irrigation channel – all paid for from the district budget. 
4. Discussion
While several projects were initiated in each village included in this study period, the research only 
found four continuing projects in the two sub-districts, eight years after the tsunami. In looking for 
“success”, the research did fi nd examples where incipient elements of collective action and adaptive 
capacity had emerged. The cattle project and the four surviving palung show that particular kinds 
of relationships can combine with capacity building activities, to support collective action toward 
addressing livelihood needs. These instances appear to have a contingent or serendipitous quality, in 
that they depended upon the presence of key contextual factors that may not be easily engineered by 
projects (King et al. 2010). Yet, certain conditions and patterns may make these particular outcomes 
more likely. Success was more likely to emerge when activities worked with accepted local authority 
structures, or mapped onto local power relations. Such outcomes required highly capable, committed 
leaders – prime movers capable of catalysing local organisations to develop rules to manage collective 
enterprises (Krishna 2007; King et al. 2010). Such leaders – or small groups of capable actors – 
shaped projects to ensure that they mapped onto the local situational logic; including developing 
appropriate rules supported by locally accepted monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Donor 
projects needed to provide space for this self-organisation, helping leaders to promote more sustainable 
outcomes and overcome collective action dilemmas, and avoid the problem of elite capture. As this 
takes time and resources, it implies ongoing support or monitoring by donors, and a capacity to work 
with state agencies over the long term (Gillespie 2004). Timing remained important in a second 
sense: successful outcomes tended to emerge only after the key actors had learnt from watching 
earlier failures. In contrast, short term success can be undermined by the perception of inequity, 
elite capture or even manipulation of schemes, aﬀ ecting the prospects for successful collective action 
over the long term. While this required a degree of local legitimacy, successful processes might not 
necessarily meet donor preconceptions of equity and participation in processes and outcomes. 
In many cases, donor projects achieved meaningful development outcomes (Brusset et al. 2009). 
Houses were built, and infrastructure and rice paddies reconstructed. For many individuals, grants 
proved of enduring value, with shop owners re-establishing their stock and reopening, and families 
obtaining livestock as grants from the Indonesian Red Cross during the reconstruction phase; and 
continuing to hold these valuable assets several years later. Yet, many of the projects which aimed 
to mobilise local participation to achieve enduring livelihood outcomes were less successful. To 
understand the reasons for this, we need to analyse the exigencies shaping donor practices; leading 
to, as one assessment report concluded, “inappropriate and poor quality programming” (Cosgrave 
2007). For several reasons “allocation and programming … were driven by the extent of public 
and media interest, and by the unprecedented funding available, rather than by assessment and 
need” (Telford and Cosgrave 2007). First, agencies involved in humanitarian aid systems tend to 
have little or unstable core funding, overlapping programmes and areas of work, and only partial 
coordination. At the same time, disasters remain critical for both fund raising and the profi le 
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of humanitarian agencies (Lyons 2009). These incentives led to particular practices. Agencies 
experienced pressure to be seen to deliver results, and this led quickly to competition between 
agencies and reduced coordination (Cosgrave 2007). As one evaluation report noted, the need to 
spend money quickly and visibly “led to many poorly executed aid projects and acted against the 
best interests of aﬀ ected people” (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition n.d.: 2). Despite the PP/livelihood 
philosophy, there was a “poor understanding of context”, and the PP template led to “stereotyped 
responses”, sometimes leading to detrimental outcomes that increased inequality and jealousy 
(Tsunami Evaluation Coalition n.d., 15). Consequently, one report found “inappropriate and poor 
quality programming” (Cosgrave 2007). Noting an obvious contradiction between philosophy and 
practice, the authors concluded that agencies have agreed to standards and codes of conduct but 
had failed to meet them. Accountability to donors at home and the need to demonstrate outcomes 
to support further fund-raising campaigns make demonstrable success important, creating pressure 
to “build fast and furiously”.15 There are no sanctions for failures: the public are unaware of any 
agency’s work, so there is no push by customers for better quality. Although formal assessments 
of the needs of aﬀ ected people were undertaken, these were “often not used, often not undertaken 
jointly, and not always shared” (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition n.d.: 3).
 Interviews with villagers provide a more vernacular understanding of project outcomes. Villagers 
explained that the majority of surviving villagers were deeply depressed: “It is not that the aid 
wasn’t of benefi t … but people here only began to think about their economy after they married 
..., after they had children” …. “It was only last year” [2012, eight years after the tsunami], that 
“we began to think about the future”. Given the large number of projects in the area, there were 
few incentives for villagers to follow any particular project. This meant that when a project oﬀ ered 
assistance, many were passive or apathetic. As one villager indicated, agencies might take back the 
assistance, cancel or relocate it because it was not being used. “If it was left for three months, and 
we did not choose to continue it, rather than have a headache”, he told one agency representative, 
“it would be better if you did not provide it”.  
 With a large number of projects competing to elicit participation and disperse funds, there was 
little eﬀ ective monitoring and supervision. Village leaders describe how some villagers were paid 
a wage to fi x up their own rice paddy, taking the cash but not working on their own land, or using 
the money as a down payment on a motorcycle or other perceived need, rather than accumulating 
capital for reviving agricultural production as donors might have hoped. Collective action and 
cooperation were increasingly interest driven: actors might come together when it severed their 
interests, only to return to enduring kinship and neighbourhood that provided security (Cordaid 
and Eye on Aceh n.d.). As more than one villager noted, projects required a participating group of 
villagers to form a cooperative or user group. Funds were dispersed and activities arranged, but 
given that the project did not have a social base, the “project activity did not survive much beyond 
the photograph [of smiling villagers standing in front of the project facility or information board] 
taken by the agency before it withdrew”. In other cases, villagers received grants in kind, such as 
an outboard motor or other equipment, only to sell on this “gift”. “We were given seedlings, but at 
that time people weren’t going to their gardens – they were still trying to sort out housing – so the 
seedlings died behind the house”. 
 The outcomes of these projects can also be understood in relational terms. The formal village 
hierarchy and key infl uential fi gures, typically associated with village elite networks, became the 
15 ADB 2005a, quoted in Lyons 2009: 106.
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point of entry for donors and NGOs. Vocal and infl uential villagers described a rewarding period of 
intensive participation as advisors in implementing programmes. Mediating donor and NGO access 
provided these actors with material resources and livelihood programmes, and reinforced their status 
and power. These actors competed for access to donor activities, generating a culture of opportunism 
and completion. Given the lack of what might pass for transparent and democratic processes in a 
chaotic post-confl ict/tsunami context, other villagers perceived that particular networks benefi ted 
disproportionately. As one subdistrict head noted, jealousies between benefi ciaries with greater 
access to project benefi ts and those who felt excluded or disadvantaged led to rifts in networks. 
Those who were jealous became bitter, and it became normal for many villagers not to join village 
meetings, missing out on further opportunities. In this way, the interventions reinforced social and 
economic divisions, reinforced particular power structures while weakening competing networks, 
and thereby changing networked space in village (Cordaid and Eye on Aceh n.d.). One report from 
this period describes a “passenger psyche” or “culture of dependency” (Cordaid and Eye on Aceh 
n.d.). After donors had assessed village needs and designed their activities, many villagers simply 
sat and waited for aid to be delivered. 
The intervention did aﬀ ect patterns of collective action. Gotong royong is the key traditional vehicle 
for cooperation among villagers to attain shared goals – a form of generalised reciprocity where 
individuals help with the development or the repair of village facilities, or otherwise invest in 
collective goods, on the assumption that others will also extend help. Before the tsunami, villagers 
regularly used to participate. However, for several years post-tsunami, projects mobilised villagers 
with payments, and gotong royong was “severely aﬀ ected by an attitude of no pay, no work” 
(Cordaid and Eye on Aceh n.d.: 18). While before people had never expected help from the outside 
and had limited cash needs, now villagers were consumers focused on addressing pressing cash 
needs; for example they only felt obliged to help clean and repair the mosque once or twice a year 
at the time of a major festival. Village social sanctions no longer functioned to support these forms 
of general reciprocity, which were largely broken down.  
 This fi tted with a wider set of cultural changes. As one village noted, “before all were like family 
in the kumpung. Many people even married a distant cousin, and the village was “very intimate”. 
“After the tsunami, village leaders are not so close. All have wives from the outside, and there 
are lots of personal interests”. Further, village government had always depended upon elders with 
traditional authority (wibawa); old people with skill (cerdik pandai) in managing village aﬀ airs. 
With so many village elders having been swept away by the tsunami, village government fell into 
younger hands. As a result, there was less trust compared with before.  
 In many respects the interventions – together with other dynamics – changed the networks that 
once sustained village reciprocity and mutuality. For one informant, village marriages exemplifi ed 
these changes: “Before when young people married, all would come. This occurs no longer, as that 
sense of sociality had been lost”. Pointing to changing patterns of gotong royong, one Acehnese aid 
worker who had been heavily involved in post-tsunami work suggested that project interventions 
had degraded social capital.  
In contrast to most post-tsunami interventions, PNPM provided systematic programme discipline 
– forms of guidance, support and control – that led to sustained engagement in the village. This 
provided for sustained improvements over state planning processes, oﬀ ering opportunities for 
village learning and, where leaders could bundle PNPM with other developmental opportunities, 
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some chances for pro-poor development. However, there were signifi cant limitations: as other 
research on CDD projects have also found, marginalised groups had limited forms of participation in 
decision making processes, decisions were shaped by forms of relational power that worked against 
accountability, and villagers were fragmented or (due to the high opportunity and transaction costs 
of participation) lacked the capacity to develop proposals and lobby for funding. Alternatively, 
programme guidelines only provided for forms of public goods that had little impact on livelihoods. 
While project micro-credit schemes provided some women and their families with an adaptation 
strategy, many poor women opted out because of concerns they could not repay the debt, and non-
repayment amounted to being shamed in front of their peers. While the micro-credit might enable 
villagers to develop enterprises, many villagers were simply not in a position to choose the best 
economic option for a small business.  
5. Conclusion: Caught in a sad romance
Over the last decades, concepts of livelihoods, capacities, and social capital have become central 
to the study of the complex factors leading to poverty. In this way, the focus has shifted to the total 
package of activities and resources at the disposal of rural households, focusing on the capacities and 
capabilities of the rural poor, rather than the problems besetting state programmes or the structural 
factors constraining local actors (Bebbington 1999). Such ideas purveyed a hopeful message: the 
rural poor can work to improve their situation by their own means. Similar assumptions underpin 
post-disaster interventions. Indeed, it is clear that the community based or driven approaches 
successfully stabilised a policy narrative, legitimised project interventions, mobilised support 
across a range of actors and successfully brought together resources and actors. They also provided 
a guiding theory, a template for project action, and a heuristic for interpreting outcomes. However, 
success in these terms may not extend to success in guiding implementation, or in representing fi eld 
realities (Mosse 2005).
 In particular, the transient nature of assistance, the kind of delivery mechanisms available, the 
exit strategies set into project planning as well as the need of donors and NGOs to produce success, 
and the lack of eﬀ ective accountability relations in the fi eld context, all worked to structure how 
projects worked at rebuilding livelihoods. In counterpoint to the romance of mobilising social 
capital, interventions were often not carried out in accordance with community led narratives. In 
the absence of eﬀ ective guidance, support or control or enduring forms of accountability, projects 
did not provide incentives for continuity. Too often livelihood projects were abandoned after the 
donor surrendered them to “participants”.16  
 It is useful here, following Pelling and High (2005), to distinguish between diﬀ erent dimensions 
of approaches to developing adaptive capacity. A fi rst approach involves addressing the proximate 
causes, for instance by providing material resources to address the immediate disaster impacts, 
reviving livelihoods, engaging in short term livelihood programmes and infrastructure reconstruction, 
among other issues. It is here that the strengths of post-disaster approaches lay. A second approach 
involves supporting institutional modifi cations – attempting to change the balance of decision-
making power, and the constraints to access resources for future adaptation and development. To 
be sure some interventions – such as those that attempted to develop community owned palung 
16 The key point here is that a particular post-disaster situational logic aﬀ ected the modes of social action 
that occurred in networked space, infl uencing both what was desirable and achievable at a particular time. 
Villages had limited capacity to absorb the aid. As the workings of vertical and horizontal networks came 
into play, these relational dynamics shaped the forms of social action associated with the interventions.
– tried this to some degree. However, interventions needed to “fi t” with clearly identifi able local 
networks, structures and practices to get things done. Otherwise, projects that do not build on 
local networks would tend to fall over when the NGO staﬀ  withdrew. In the absence of long term 
investments, for the most part, projects could hardly modify the institutional logics on which they 
depended. Rather, interventions tended to reinforce existing patterns of social relations and power 
structures. Establishing a new logic of local institutional action would require engaging in the long 
term partnerships and capacity building, something beyond most donor timelines (Zanotti 2010).  
 A third, more transformative approach would involve engaging with the causal structure of 
vulnerability and poverty, by fi nding ways to link socio-economic development with a reduction 
in the vulnerability associated with the disaster and confl ict (Ribot 2011; Bassett and Fogelman 
2013). This type of transformative adaptation would entail identifying the processes producing 
vulnerability and where possible, redressing them. Immiseration occurred after the synergies 
between farming and other economic activity eroded, while agricultural production decreased 
sharply (McCarthy, forthcoming). The pathway to improvement entails investing in developing 
agricultural livelihoods and social protection systems, along with the revival of oﬀ  farm working 
opportunities, and outmigration over the longer term. Unfortunately, CBD/CDD approaches were 
not aimed specifi cally at addressing these issues. Too often they attempted to assist the development 
of livelihoods, developing adaptive capacity without addressing the underlying causes.
 An underlying problem is conceptual – community led approaches are based on a narrative 
sug-gested by an instrumental reading of the social capital literature: pre-existing forms of social 
cohesion can provide a basis for collective action to address critical needs. Given the depth of 
disruption and trauma, villagers may not be able to take up the position of participatory subjects 
or communities rich in social capital; nor was the logic of Acehnese social action well suited to 
participatory logics. As we have seen, despite superfi cial indications of social capital, individuals 
tend to address their vulnerability through individualised networks of reciprocity, or through vertical 
relations of dependence. The former tend to be highly diﬀ erentiated, not always present among the 
very poor who may not be able to reciprocate within horizontal networks of reciprocity, or work 
against wider forms of collective action (Cleaver 2005). The latter are embedded in asymmetrical 
power relations that may disable attempts to institutionalise accountability, leading to jealousy and 
confl ict in ways that ultimately undermine collective action.  
 A well-articulated critique of post-tsunami aid suggests that the solution to many of the problems 
raised by these interventions is more “local ownership” (Brusset et al. 2009). While there is some 
truth to this, given the contingent, context-specifi c nature of relational dynamics, the problem is 
more complex. Creating new participatory institutions from scratch may lead to a project being 
abandoned after the donor withdraws, particularly if the arrangements inadequately gel with how 
people organise themselves. But projects that use local networks may be subject to unaccountable 
and potentially exploitative social relationships. Where projects became opportunities for some 
actors, and are shaped by relational power dynamics and generate community fragmentation, 
projects can be captured by some networks or collapse under legitimacy problems. Yet, in other 
cases, elite control can be benefi cial to poorer people: if dynamic leaders, willing and able to 
facilitate community-level projects and governance, adapt projects to pro-poor ends, or bundle elite 
interests with the interests of the poor, this can generate poverty alleviating outcomes.  
 Other readings of social capital suggest that eﬀ ective outcomes can emerge from state-society 
synergy (Evans 1995; Adger 2003). However, following the confl ict and tsunami, the Aceh context 
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is characterised by state and civil society dysfunction and disorganisation. The strategy of the 
well-designed PNPM project studied here was one of avoiding the hard work of rebuilding formal 
state governance structures and processes and seeking to build networks and expand the space 
for collective action and the provision of public goods. As in other cases, well designed projects 
can engage with these networks and have a record of providing better outcomes than state based 
activities, especially in terms of developing village infrastructure (Sari et al. 2011). However, most 
assess-ments remain deeply ambivalent about participatory approaches that often lead to limited 
forms of empowerment and only marginally address poverty. This suggests that the build back 
better narrative that applies participatory approaches leads to a quandary. Attempting to build back 
better through CBD/CDD approaches can leave donors and aid recipients caught in a sad romance: 
projects applying participatory narratives needed to act as if they were working to achieve outcomes 
even while the donor practices, situational logics and accountability relations mostly undermined 
successful community led outcomes.17    
In conclusion, the policy implications are manifold. Donors and project interventions need to 
reassess assumptions and scale down ambitions. After reconstructing infrastructure quickly, 
intervention practices need to develop frameworks for addressing poverty over the longer term. 
While community based/driven approaches may be suited to particular objectives, such as building 
infrastructure, they are clearly not the only or necessarily the best tool for addressing vulnerability. 
Donors need to be less short-sighted and shift their gaze beyond the exigencies of disaster to make 
use of the proven strategies for responding to vulnerability (Devereuz, Vaitla, and Swan 2008). 
This entails turning back to developing long term solutions based on partnerships that engage local 
actors and the state more eﬀ ectively to pursue longer term development.
17 Part of the problem is that vulnerability is to some extent embedded in uneven local social relations, 
and aid interventions depend upon these very same social relations to achieve their objectives (McCar-
thy, unpubl. paper). 
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